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TITLE 77
UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
Repeals and Reenactments. -Title 77, Chapters 1 to 66, the Code of Criminal Procedure,
was repealed by Laws 1980, ch. 15, § 1, effective July 1, 1980, and present Utah Code of Criminal
Procedure, Chapters 1 to 34, was enacted in its place by § 2 of the same act.
Section 3 of Laws 1980, ch. 15 provided: "Nothing in this act shall be construed to repeal any
particular section of Title 77, if that section is the subject of an amendment or new legislation
enacted by this budget session of the 43rd Utah legislature and which becomes law. It is the intent
of the legislature that the corresponding sections of this act shall be construed with such amended
sections so as to give effect to the amendment as if it were made a part of this act."

Chapter
1. Preliminary Provisions.
la. Peace Officer Designation.
2. Prosecution, Screening and Diversion.
2a. Pleas in Abeyance.
3. Security to Keep the Peace.
4. Suppression of Resistance to Service of Process.
5. Impeachments.
6. Removal by Judicial Proceedings.
7. Arrest, by Whom, and How Made.
8. Lineups.
8a. Criminal Offense Charges.
9. Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit.
10. Formation of the Grand Jury [Repealed].
10a. Grand Jury Reform.
11. Powers and Duties of Grand Jury [Repealed].
12. Indictment [Repealed].
13. Pleas.
14. Defenses.
15. Inquiry into Sanity of Defendant.
16. Mental Examination After Conviction.
16a. Commitment and Treatment of Mentally Ill Persons.
17. The Trial.
18. The Judgment.
18a. The Appeal.
19. The Execution.
20. Bail.
20a. Bail Forfeiture Procedure.
21. Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State
in Criminal Proceedings.
22. Subpoena Powers for Aid of Criminal Investigation and Grants of
Immunity.
22a. Administrative Subpoenas in Controlled Substances Investigations.
23. Search and Administrative Warrants.
23a. Interception of Communications.
23b. Access to Electronic Communications.
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Chapter
24. Disposal of Property Received by Peace Officer.
24a. Unclaimed Personal Property.
25. Justice Courts.
26. Criminal Identification [Renumbered].
26a. Missing Children Registry [Repealed].
27. Pardons and Paroles.
28. Western Interstate Corrections Compact.
28a. Interstate Corrections Compact.
28b. Interjurisdictional Transfer of Prisoners.
29. Disposition of Detainers Against Prisoners.
30. Extradition.
31. Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.
32. Counsel for Indigent Defendants.
32a. Defense Costs.
33. Uniform Rendition of Prisoners as Witnesses in Criminal Proceedings
Act.
34. Uniform Interstate Furlough Compact.
35. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure [Repealed].
36. Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act.
37. Victims' Rights.
38. Rights of Crime Victims Act.
39. Sale of Tobacco and Alcohol to Under Age Persons.

CHAPTERl
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
Section

Section
77-1-5.
77-1-6.

Short title.
77-1-2. Criminal procedure prescribed.
77-1-3. Definitions.
77-1-4. Conviction to precede punishment.
77-1-1.

77-1-7.

Prosecuting party.
Rights of defendant.
Dismissal without trial - Custody
or discharge of defendant.

77-1-1. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Code of Criminal
Procedure."
History: C. 1953, 77-1-1, enacted by L
1980,ch. 15, § 2.
Meaningof"this act."-Laws 1980, ch. 15,
§ 2 enacted Chapters 1 to 34 of this title. See
note under catchline "Repeals and Reenactments" at the beginning of the title. Because
provisions have since been aqqed, repealed,
and amended, "this act" should probably be
read as "this title."

Cross-References. - Ex post facto laws
forbidden, Utah Const., Art. I, § 18.
Jurisdiction and venue of criminal actions,
§§ 76-1-201, 76-1-202.
Revised statutes not retroactive, § 68-3-3.
State Commission on Criminal and Juvenile
Justice, § 63-25-1 et seq.
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Utah Law Review. - Nevada's 1967 Criminal Procedure Law from Arrest to Trial: One
State's Response to a Widely Recognized Need,
1969 Utah L. Rev. 520.

77-1-2.

C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 25.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law <S=>12.

Criminal procedure prescribed.

The procedure in criminal cases shall be as prescribed in this title, the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, and such further rules as may be adopted by the
Supreme Court of Utah.
History: C. 1953, 77-1-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Cross-References. - Annexation of county
as affecting prosecutions and prisoners,§§ 172-5, 17-2-12.

Effect of creation of new county on pending
prosecutions and prior offenses,§§ 17-3-7,173-8.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Common law.
As the state is bound by the Code of Criminal
Procedure, it is unnecessary to inquire what
was the rule at common law when the statute
speaks. United States v. Cannon, 4 Utah 122, 7
P. 369, aff'd, 116 U.S. 55, 6 S. Ct. 278, 29 L. Ed.
561 (1885).
This section excludes all common-law prac-

77-1-3.

tice. United States v. Cutler, 5 Utah 608, 19P.
145 (1888).
The rules for testing an indictment in this
state are those prescribed by Code of Criminal
Procedure, and not the rules of the common
law. People v. Kerm, 8 Utah 268, 30 P. 988
(1892).

Definitions.

For the purpose of this act:
(1) "Criminal action" means the proceedings by which a person is
charged, accused, and brought to trial for a publie offense.
(2) "Indictment" means an accusation in writing presented by a grand
jury to the district court charging a person with a public offense.
(3) "Information" means an accusation, in writing, charging a person
with a public offense which is presented, signed, and filed in the officeof
the clerk where the prosecution is commenced pursuant to Section
77-2-1.1.
(4) "Magistrate" means a justice or judge of a court of record or not of
record or a commissioner of such a court appointed in accordance with
Section 78-3-31.
History: C. 1953, 77-1-3, enacted by L.
1; 1983,ch.
1980,ch. 15,§ 2;1981,ch.68,§
212, § 1; 1985, ch. 174, § 2; 1985, ch. 212,
§ 16;1990,ch.59,§
26; 1991,ch.268,§
16;
1992, ch. 33, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effective January 1, 1992, substituted "or
judge of a court of record or not of record or a
commissioner of such a court appointed in accordance with Section 78-3-31" for "of the Supreme Court, a judge of the district courts, a
judge of the juvenile courts, a judge of the

circuit courts, a judge of the justice courts, or a
judge of any court created by law" in Subsection
(4).

The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,
1992, in Subsection (3) substituted "presented,
signed, and filed"for "presented and signed bya
prosecuting attorney" and "commenced pursu•
ant to Section 77-2-1.1" for "commenced or
subscribed and sworn to by a complaining witness before a magistrate if the offense is a class
B misdemeanor or a lesser offense not requiring
approval of the prosecuting attorney."
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Meaning of "this act." - See note under
same catchline following§ 77-1-1.
Cross-References. - Grand juries, Chapter 10a of this title.

Prosecutions
U.R.Cr.P.

of public offenses, Rule 4,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Information.
Jurisdiction.
Cited.

Information.
Once the information is authorized, its presentment and filing are not acts that the prosecuting attorney must personally perform.
State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646 P.2d 727
(Utah 1982).
Jurisdiction.
District judge was magistrate entitled to hold
preliminary examinations in case of misdemeanor.State v. McIntyre, 92 Utah 177, 66 P.2d
879 (1937).
A justice of the peace has power to issue
search warrants. Allen v. Holbrook, 103 Utah

319, 135 P.2d 242, modified on rehearing and
petition denied, 103 Utah 599, 139 P.2d 233
(1943).
A judge or justice when acting in the role of
magistrate was limited to the jurisdiction and
powers conferred by law upon magistrates. Van
Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1977).
Ajudicial officer functioning as a magistrate
is not functioning as a circuit court or other
court of record. Because magistrates are not
courts ofrecord when they conduct preliminary
hearings and issue bindover orders, under the
current jurisdictional statutes their orders are
not immediately appealable. State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991).

Cited in State v. Milligan, 727 P.2d 213
(Utah 1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am.Jur. 2d. - 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indictments
and Informations § 1.
C.J.S.- 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations §§ 4, 8; 48A C.J.S. Judges §§ 4, 161; 80
C.J.S. Sheriffs and Constables § 1; 81A C.J.S.
States § 139.

77-1-4. Conviction

I

(

I
I

Key Numbers. - Indictment and Information e= 17, 35; Judges e=> 1; Sheriffs and
Constables e=> 1; States e=> 68, 74.

to precede punishment.

No person shall be punished for a public offense until convicted in a court
having jurisdiction.
History: C. 1953, 77-1-4, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15, § 2.
Cross-References. - No person to be de-

77-1-5. Prosecuting

prived of life or liberty without due process of
law, Utah Const., Art. I,§ 7.

party.

A criminal action for any violation of a state statute shall be prosecuted in
the name of the state of Utah. A criminal action for violation of any county or
municipal ordinance shall be prosecuted in the name of the governmental
entity involved.
History: C. 1953, 77-1-5, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15, § 2.
Cross-References. - Prosecutions to be

conducted in name of"the State of Utah," Utah
Const., Art. VIII, § 16.
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C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 21.

77-1-6. Rights of defendant.
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him;
(c) To testify in his own behalf;
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in
his behalf;
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district
where the offense is alleged to have been committed;
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail,
and if the business of the court permits.
(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled~
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or•
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received;
;,
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a
husband against his wife; and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by
magistrate.
History: C. 1953, 77-1-5, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Cross-References. - Attorneys, rights in
disbarment proceedings, § 78-51-16.
Constitutional rights of accused, Utah
Const., Art. I, § 12.
Counsel for indigents, § 77-32-1 et seq.
Discharge of defendant turned state's witness,§ 77-17-2.
Dismissal without trial, Rule 25, U.R.Cr.P.
Due process of law, Utah Const., Art. I, § 7.
Errors and defects not affecting substantial
rights disregarded, Rule 30, U.R.Cr.P.

Husband or wife not competent witn
against or for each other without consent, exceptions, § 78-24-8.
Jury trial and waiver thereof, Utah Cons•
Art. I,§ 10; Rule 17, U.R.Cr.P.
•
Lineup procedures, § 77-8-1 et seq.
Multiple prosecutions and double jeopanl
§ 76-1-401 et seq.
•
Ordinance violation cases, jeopardy in, § 1 '
7-65.
•
Subpoena for witnesses for impecunious de.i
fendant in criminal case, § 21-5-14.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Appearance at trial in prison clothing.
-Waiver of right.
Confrontation of witness.
-Depositions.
-Right to interpreter.
-Stipulation of testimony.

-Testimony at former trial.
-Testimony at preliminary hearing.
Copy of accusation.
-Bill of particulars.
Double jeopardy.
- Retrial proper.
-Separate offenses.
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witness on preliminary examination might be
read at trial if witness was dead, or insane, or
could not, with due diligence, be found within
state did not conflict with right, guaranteed to
defendant by Utah Const., Art. I, § 12, to be
confronted with witnesses against him. State v.
King, 24 Utah 482, 68 P. 418, 91 Am. St. R. 808
(1902).

-Waiver.
Feebefore final judgment.
Jury trial.
-Impartial jury.
Preliminaryhearing.
Presenceat trial.
-Waiver.
Publictrial.
Rightto appeal.
Rightto counsel.
-Waiver.
Self-incrimination.
-Claiming and waiving privilege.
-Confessions.
Speedytrial.
-Delays by defendant.
-Federal custody.
-Thirty-day requirement.
-Waiver.
Testimonyof spouse.
-Comment on failure of spouse to testify.
-Competency.
-Right of spouse to testify in own behalf.
-Time of marriage.
-Waiver.
Transcripts.
-Legibility.
Cited.

-Right to interpreter.
Accused is not confronted by a witness whose
language he cannot understand. In such a case
an interpreter should be appointed. State v.
Vasquez, 101 Utah 444, 121 P.2d 903, 140
A.L.R. 755 (1942), reviewed in State v. Masato
Karumai, 101 Utah 592, 126 P.2d 1047 (1942)
in which it was held that court of its ow~
motion might appoint an interpreter for defendant at the state's expense.
Even though trial court erred in not furnishing an interpreter, the case would not be reversed unless it was shown that defendant was
prejudiced thereby in his defense. Furthermore, failure to make timely objection waived
the right to be confronted by the adverse witnesses. State v. Masato Karumai, 101 Utah
592, 126 P.2d 1047 (1942).

Appearance at trial in prison clothing.
Defendant has a constitutional right not to
appear in identifiable prison clothing at trial;
this does not require state to provide defendant
with an expensive wardrobe, but state should
provideclean, respectable clothes, not identifiable as prtson clothes, for defendant at trial.
Chessv. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980).
-Waiver of right.
Trial judge should on his own initiative inquire of a defendant whether he wishes to
waivehis right not to appear in prison clothes
sothat the record affirmatively shows an intelligentand conscious waiver by the defendant if
he chooses to stand trial in prison clothes.
Chessv. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980).
Confrontation of witness.
Defendant could not be denied right to be
confrontedby witness against him because of
witness'syouth, incapacity, or unwillingness to
meet him face to face. State v. Mannion, 19
Utah 505, 57 P. 542, 45 L.R.A. 638, 75 Am. St.
R. 753 (1899).
In a murder case, it was not grounds for
reversal that trial court outlined damaging
anticipated testimony of witness who did not
appear against defendant as scheduled, where
there was good faith on the part of the prosecutor,and where there was sufficient independent
evidence to support the conviction. State v.
Fisher, 680 P.2d 35 (Utah 1984).
-Depositions.
Former statute providing that deposition of

-Stipulation of testimony.
Stipulating testimony of witnesses did not
violate this guarantee. State v. Mortensen 26
'
Utah 312, 73 P. 562 (1903).
-Testimony at former trial.
Where accessory to crime had been convicted
in previous trial, but refused to testify at trial of
principal, it was reversible error to read to the
jury the accessory's testimony from the official
transcript of the previous trial, since that denied defendant his fundamental right to confront the witnesses against him. State v.
Kendrick, 538 P.2d 313 (Utah 1975).
-Testimony at preliminary hearing.
Admission into evidence of transcript of testimony of witness who testified for state on
preliminary hearing, and was cross-examined
by counsel for defendant at hearing, did not
violate constitutional right of defendant to be
confronted by witness, who was absent from
state. State v. Vance, 38 Utah 1, 110 P. 434
(1910).
The right of confrontation was not violated by
allowing testimony of witnesses, taken at preliminary hearing, who were shown to be absent
from the state, to be read into evidence by the
state. State v. Inlow, 44 Utah 485, 141 P. 530,
1917AAnn. Cas. 741 (1914).
Where witness testified on preliminary examination, and all the proceedings were had in
presence of defendant, and he was given full
opportunity to cross-examine witness, stenographic transcript of testimony of witness could
be read on trial for first degree murder where
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proper foundation had been laid by showing
that witness could not, after exercise of due
diligence, be found in state. State v. Hillstrom,
46 Utah 341, 150 P. 935 (1915).
It was not error to permit transcript of testimony of witness, which was taken at preliminary hearing, to be read in evidence at the trial
when such witness was not "within the state";
nor was it necessary, to constitute due diligence, to do more than show that witness was
not, in fact, within the state. State v. De Pretto,
48 Utah 249, 155 P. 336 (1916).
It was not error for counsel for the state to
read in evidence testimony of a witness who
testified at the preliminary hearing but was not
present at the trial. State v. Burke, 102 Utah
249, 129 P.2d 560 (1942).

Copy of accusation.
This guaranty entitled the defendant to insist, at the outset, that the indictment apprise
him of the crime charged with such reasonable
certainty that he could make his defense and
protect himself after judgment against another
prosecution for the same offense. State v.
Topham, 41 Utah 39, 42, 123 P.2d 888 (1912).
An indictment for conspiracy to violate antivice laws of this state need not allege offense
that was object of conspiracy in same detail as
where defendant was charged with commission
of that offense. State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365,
120 P.2d 285 (1941).
An information which accused the defendant
"of the crime of murder in the first degree" did
not infringe this section, or its counterpart in
Utah Const., Art. I, § 12. State v. Avery, 102
Utah 33, 125 P.2d 803 (1942).
-Bill of particulars.
If accused was in doubt as to the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, the alleged
fact or facts which the state proposed to prove
could be secured by demanding a bill of particulars. State v. Robbins, 102 Utah 119, 127 P.2d
1042 (1942).
Double jeopardy.
Where jury was impaneled and sworn to try
case, and after evidence was all in, court refused to submit case to jury, defendant was
thereby placed in jeopardy, and could not be
tried for crime charged in information, or for
any offense included therein. State v. Hows, 31
Utah 168, 87 P. 163 (1906).
Defendant was in jeopardy when jury was
impaneled and sworn and issues presented on
valid indictment or information in court of
competent jurisdiction. State v. Thompson, 58
Utah 291, 199 P. 161, 38 A.L.R. 697 (1921).
Pendency of another action for same offense
may not be set up by accused either as plea in
abatement or as plea in bar, although state
ought not insist on holding defendant under
bail in one of its courts and at same time

deprive him of his liberty in another, unless,
there
is substantial
reason
therefor.
Nickolopolous v. Emery, 59 Utah 588, 206 P. 284
(1922).
The accused was not "twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense" by permitting state, in
prosecution for possessing intoxicating liquor
in violation oflaw, to give evidence of offensesof
which defendant had been acquitted, separate
from and not included in offense charged. State
v. Lyte, 75 Utah 283, 284 P. 1006 (1930).

-Retrial proper.
Defendant who moved for and obtained new
trial after conviction of second degree murder
on indictment under which he might have been
convicted of first degree murder could lawfully
be tried again for first degree murder. State v.
Kessler, 15 Utah 142, 49 P. 293, 62 Am. St. R.
911 (1897).
Trial, conviction, and sentence, illegal and
void because trial was had before unlawful jury,
did not have effect of putting defendant oncein
jeopardy, and, on his release from custody on
habeas corpus, he could be rearrested on same
charge and on same indictment, and no plea of
once in jeopardy could be bar to lawful trial
notwithstanding
illegal conviction stood
unreversed. State v. Bates, 22 Utah 65, 61 P.
905, 83 Am. St. R. 768 (1900).
Where jury was properly discharged for failure to agree upon verdict, plea of once in
jeopardy could not thereafter be interposed
against subsequent prosecution for same offense in any degree. Nickolopolous v. Emery,59
Utah 588, 206 P. 284 (1922).
Where trial judge did not abuse discretion in
discharging jury, upon their inability to reach
verdict after 28 hours of deliberation, plea of
former jeopardy in subsequent prosecution was
without any basis or support. State v. Gardner,
62 Utah 62, 217 P. 976 (1923).
Where one was convicted upon complain~
information, or indictment, which was so defective in substance that it failed to state public
offense in contemplation oflaw, he had not been
in jeopardy, and hence plea of former conviction
or acquittal was no defense. State v. Empey,63
Utah 609, 239 P. 25, 44 A.L.R. 558 (1925).
Order of examining magistrate finding defen.
dant "guilty as charged," and committing him
to custody to answer charge, did not constitute
former jeopardy. State v. Dean, 69 Utah 268,
254 P. 142 (1927).
Defendant, whose sentence for robbery upon
a plea of guilty was vacated because proper
protection of his constitutional rights was not
afforded and who was recommitted for identical
offense after jury trial, failed to establish basis
upon which former jeopardy could be found.
State v. Jaramillo, 25 Utah 2d 328, 481 P.2d394
(1971).
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-Separate offenses.
Acquittal of a person for one offense was no
bar to prosecution for another, unless it appearedthat some essential element of the second offense was necessarily adjudicated and
determined in the offense of which he was
acquitted. State v. Cheeseman, 63 Utah 138,
223P. 762 (1924).
Acquittalunder former§ 57-7-102 for failure
to report automobile accident was not bar to
manslaughter prosecuiion. State v. Cheeseman,63 Utah 138, 223 P. 762 (1924).
Conviction of motorist for reckless driving
didnot bar subsequent prosecution for involuntary manslaughter. State v. Empey, 65 Utah
609,239 P. 25, 44 A.L.R. 558 (1925).
Defendant who had been charged with issuing a fictitious check was not put twice in
jeopardy for the same offense where, subsequent to the dismissal of the first charge, he
was convicted of forgery on the basis of the
sametransaction from which the prior charge
had arisen; double jeopardy protected only
against subsequent prosecution for the same
offense.State v. Harris, 30 Utah 2d 354, 517
P.2d1313 (1974).
-Waiver.
Defense of former jeopardy was waived unless made at time of entering plea or at such
othertime as court might permit. State v. Bohn,
67Utah 362, 248 P. 119 (1926).
Fee before final judgment.
Aconvictionand sentencing for driving under
the influence of alcohol was a "final judgment,"
thus rendering the rule against fees in Subsection (2)(b) inapplicable. State v. Johnson, 700
P.2d1125 (Utah 1985).
Jury trial.
Former statute that permitted court to enjoin
practiceof medicine contrary to law was valid
as against contention that it deprived defendant of jury trial in proceeding for violation of
penalstatute. Board of Medical Exmrs. v. Blair,
57Utah 516, 196 P. 221 (1921).
Fine authorized by§ 47-1-8 was not punishment imposed after commission of crime but
wasa payment exacted for doing an act prohibited by law, and hence contention that statute
was unconstitutional in injunction proceeding
against liquor nuisance, on ground that it permittedimposition of punishment in equity proceeding, was without merit. State ex rel.
Pincockv. Franklin, 63 Utah 442, 226 P. 674
(1924).

-Impartial jury.
Whereone of jurors during trial, almost daily,
rode back and forth from his home to courthousewith prosecuting witness who had taken
active part in prosecution, defendant had not
been given trial by impartial jury. State v.

77-1-6

Anderson, 65 Utah 415, 237 P. 941 (1925).
Fact that juror was in restroom when picture
of victim in his coffin was shown had no prejudicial effect since several photographs of victim
were introduced during trial to refute claim of
accidental injury. Gee v. Smith, 541 P.2d 6
(Utah 1975).

Preliminary hearing.
Defendant was denied the protections of a
preliminary hearing on the offense for which he
was convicted, where although he had been
bound over to the district court to answer for a
particular charge, the trial testimony involved
a criminal episode for which he had not been
bound over. State v. Ortega, 751 P.2d 1138
(Utah 1988).
Presence at trial.
Defendant, charged with felony, could not
waive his right to be personally present at trial.
State v. Mannion, 19 Utah 505, 57 P. 542, 45
L.R.A. 638, 75 Am. St. R. 753 (1899).
Where defendant was in custody and therefore not a free agent, duty was on court to see
that he was personally present at every stage of
the trial. State v. Aikers, 87 Utah 507, 51 P.2d
1052 (1935).
Where two defendants were being prosecuted
for robbery, and during morning jury was impaneled with only one defendant present, and
in afternoon other defendant presented himself
and did not object to jury and did not wish to
challenge any member thereof, absent defendant was not denied constitutional right to be
present during trial since trial as to such absent defendant did not start until afternoon
when he was present and accepted jury. State v.
Aikers, 87 Utah 507, 51 P.2d 1052 (1935).
A defendant charged with a crime is entitled
to be present at all stages of trial. State v.
Houtz, 714 P.2d 677 (Utah 1986).
-Waiver.
The right to appear and defend in person is a
constitutional one, but may be waived under
certain circumstances if the defendant voluntarily absents himself from the trial. State v.
Houtz, 714 P.2d 677 (Utah 1986).
It is the responsibility of an out-of-custody
defendant to remain in contact with his or her
attorney and with the court. If the defendant
fails to do so, he cannot benefit from his misconduct by manipulating a rule designed for his
protection. State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Public trial.
Order of trial court excluding all spectators,
including friends and relatives of defendant,
exclusive of witnesses, was denial of right to
"public trial" in violation of Utah Const., Art. I,
§ 12. State v. Jordan, 57 Utah 612, 196 P. 565
(1921), limited by State v. Beckstead, 96 Utah
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528, 88 P.2d 461 (1939).
A mere temporary order of exclusion of spectators may not be obnoxious to the objection
that it deprives accused of right to public trial
under Utah Const., Art. I, § 12. State v. Bonza,
72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480 (1928).
Excluding the general public from the courtroom did not deprive accused of a "public trial"
as guaranteed by Utah Const., Art. I, § 12, but
excluding relatives and friends of accused, and
permitting sister of prosecutrix to remain, did
deprive him of this constitutional right. State v.
Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480 (1928).
Where it was clearly indicated that friends
and relatives of accused were not excluded, and
order was made on stipulation of counsel, defendant was not in a position to urge that the
case be reversed because of order excluding
persons not interested or in some way connected with the case. State v. Smith, 90 Utah
482, 62 P.2d 1110 (1936), quoting order and
stating that it was not so drastic as ones
condemned in State v. Jordan, 57 Utah 612, 196
P. 565 (1921), and State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177,
269 P. 480 (1928).
Defendant in prosecution for carnally knowing female was deprived of a "public trial" when
judge ordered courtroom cleared of all spectators, although judge could have cleared the
courtroom except for a reasonable number of
defendant's relatives or friends selected by him.
State v. Beckstead, 96 Utah 528, 88 P.2d 461
(1939).

Right to appeal.
One who pled guilty could nevertheless appeal to district court. Weaver v. Kimball, 59
Utah 72, 202 P. 9 (1921).
Statutes making final and nonappealable
judgments of city courts and of justices of the
peace in criminal cases, unless validity or constitutionality of a statute or ordinance was
involved, did not deny accused "the right to
appeal" when read in connection with Utah
Const., Art. VIII, § 9. State v. Lyte, 75 Utah
283, 284 P. 1006 (1930).
Right to counsel.
Accused was not denied the right to appear
and defend in person, where he discharged his
counsel during his trial for first degree murder,
and court, to protect defendant's interests, appointed same counsel to represent him as amici
curiae, it appearing that defendant's action in
"firing'' his counsel was senseless. State v.
Hillstrom, 46 Utah 341, 150 P. 935 (1915).
Person charged with crime should have reasonable time to prepare his defense, otherwise
defendant's right to fair and impartial trial
might be nullified; to ensure defendant full
enjoyment of his constitutional privilege, time
between appointment of counsel by court and
time of trial should be such as to afford reason-

able opportunity for preparation of defe
State v. Fairclough, 86 Utah 326, 44 P.2d
(1935).

-Waiver.
Constitutional right to appear and defend
person and by counsel was sacred right of
accused of crime which might not be in •
or frittered away; right might not be denied
a court or be waived by counsel, but defend
might, by conduct or in words, waive such •
since he could not take advantage of his vol
tary absence if he was at liberty on bail d •
some part of the proceedings at which it was •
duty, as well as his right, to be in attendan
State v. Aikers, 87 Utah 507, 51 P.2d 10
(1935).
Self-incrimination.
Production by bank official of insurance po
cies contained in defendant's safety deposit •
in prosecution of defendant for murder of '
wife was not attempt by state to compel defi
dant to be witness against himself. State
Woods, 62 Utah 397, 220 P. 215 (1923).
Constitutional privilege against self-incrinii,
nation protects witness as well as party
cused of crime in civil as well as in cri •
action from being required to give testimoDJ,
that tends to incriminate him. State 'f.
Byington, 114 Utah 388, 200 P.2d 723, i
A.L.R.2d 1393 (1948).
-Claiming and waiving privilege.
,
In a criminal prosecution, the general ruleii
that the right to refuse to answer incrimina •
questions is a personal privilege of the witn '
which he may either exercise or waive, and,it
the witness chooses to answer incrimina • •
questions, neither defendant nor his counsel
may legally object. State v. Shockley, 29 Utali;
25, 80 P. 865, 110 Am. St. R. 639 (1905).
Where a witness is the defendant in a crimi,
nal proceeding, he need not personally mak,
the objection and claim his privilege from q~
tions asked respecting the commission of othet
crimes by him, on the ground that such que,f
tions are incriminating, but he may claim •'
immunity through his counsel. State 1
Shockley, 29 Utah 25, 80 P. 865, 110 Am. St. B:
639 (1905).
.,
False testimony of woman with whom dti
vorced husband was living that they were ma,!
ried, in response to court's questions after sbi
was immediately brought into court by she •
pursuant to court's order and required to
tify, was given in violation of her constitutio~·
privilege against self-incrimination so as nottlf
be admissible in subsequent perjury prosec11:
tion. State v. Byington, 114 Utah 388, 200 P.2d
723, 5 A.L.R.2d 1393 (1948).
,
Where divorced husband, who was witho~.
court experience, advice of counsel or knowl:i
edge of his constitutional privilege againstse~
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incrimination, and who was openly and notoriouslyliving as husband and wife with woman
whowas not his wife and with whom child was
begotten, declined to testify and testified only
when required to do so by court at hearing on
order to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt in failing to pay alimony
and support money pursuant to divorce decree,
his false answer in response to court's question
whetherhe had remarried, that he was married
tothat woman, was inadmissible in subsequent
perjury prosecution as violative of constitutionalprivilege against self-incrimination, even
though question was proper and, when asked,
divorcedhusband did not claim privilege. State
v. Byington, 114 Utah 388, 200 P.2d 723, 5
A.L.R.2d1393 (1948).
Where defendant took the stand to testify in
his own defense, he thereby consented to answerquestions on cross-examination to test the
truthfulness of his assertions and waived his
privilege against self-incrimination. State v.
Younglove,17 Utah 2d 268, 409 P.2d 125 (1965).
Defendant waived privilege not to testify on
material matters when he testified in his own
behalf, and would not be allowed to select
matter in his own favor and refuse to be subjectedto the same sort of cross-examination as
any other witness. State v. Anderson, 27 Utah
2d 276, 495 P.2d 804 (1972).

-Confessions.
When the state seeks to put the confession
beforethe jury it must establish its competency
tothe court by showing that the confession was
givenby the accused as his voluntary act; as an
expression of his independent and free will,
uninfluencedby fear of punishment or by hope
ofreward; that it was not induced or influenced
by any advantages or benefits that might accrue to hiIIl or those near or· dear to him, nor
was it given to lighten any penalties or punishments the law might impose on him if tried and
convictedwithout confessing; and that it was
not given as a result of a desire to escape or
avoid any misery, threats, acts, or conduct of
any other person, having it in their power, or
whom he believed had it in their power, to
inflictupon him, or upon those whom it was his
duty or privilege to protect. State v. Crank, 105
Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178, 170 A.L.R. 542 (1943);
State v. Mares, 113 Utah 225, 192 P.2d 861
(1948).
In determining whether a confession was
voluntary, the court must hear all competent
evidenceoffered, both by the state and by the
accused,as to the voluntariness of the confession, and then determine independently of the
jury the competency of the evidence, that is the
voluntariness of the confession, as a matter of
law. 'lb hold otherwise violates guaranty
against self-incrimination. State v. Crank, 105
Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178, 170 A.L.R. 542.
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Speedy trial.
Conviction on charge of burglary in third
degree was reversed where defendant had been
incarcerated for 218 days prior to trial, 135 of
which were after his demand for speedy trial
since protracted incarceration of defendant'
without cause or excuse, was undue and op~
pressive and constituted denial of his right to
speedy trial. State v. Lozano, 23 Utah 2d 312
'
462 P.2d 710 (1969).
Defendant who was charged at a time he had
other cases pending against him and in one of
those cases requested and received psychiatric
examination and who was appointed various
counsel because of necessity and at his own
request was not denied right to speedy trial.
State v. Carlsen, 25 Utah 2d 136, 478 P.2d 326
(1970).
Defendant charged with a felony was not
denied his right to a speedy trial where the
pretrial delay was due to defendant's being
outside the state jurisdiction for a federal court
proceeding, some delay was due to defendant's
own actions, delays caused by the state were
appropriate and necessary under the circumstances, defendant's defense was not substantially impaired by the delay, and there was no
intentional delay of an oppressive character
resulting in prejudice to the defendant. State v.
Hafen, 593 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979).
-Delays by defendant.
Defendant's right to a speedy trial was not
denie~, where much oftj:le delay was caused by
questions over custody by different jurisdictions, and other delays were caused by motions
from the defense and two substitutions of defendant's counsel. State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137
(Utah 1989).
Delays caused by the defendant will not be
counted against the State and will weigh
against the _defendant in considering whether,
under the circumstances, the trial was unnecessarily delayed. State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704
(Utah 1990).
-Federal custody.
Time a defendant spends in custody of federal authorities cannot be counted against the
state for speedy trial purposes. State v. Trafny,
799 P.2d 704 (Utah 1990).
-Thirty-day requirement.
Requirement that accused be tried within
thirty days of arraignment was directory rather
than mandatory, and where trial was held two
weeks late after three postponements due to
circumstances not caused by the prosecution,
defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. State v.
Rasmussen, 18 Utah 2d 201, 418 P.2d 134
(1966).
Defendant was not denied right to a speedy
trial where trial date was originally set within
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30-day limit but had to be postponed beyond
the limit due to the original date being a legal
holiday and unavailability of defendant's counsel. State v. Archuletta, 577 P.2d 547 (Utah
1978).
Requirement of trial within 30 days after
arraignment is not mandatory but directory;
defendant who was tried four and a half
months after filing of information was not deprived of speedy trial where he made no objection at the time to the delay and in fact requested two of the three continuances which
were had before trial. State v. Menzies, 601 P.2d
925 (Utah 1979).
In dealing with a two-day deviation from the
30-day statutory period in Subsection (l)(h),
the appellate court will not presume either
prejudice or a lack of regularity in the trial
court's proceedings. State v. Parry, 714 P.2d
1160 (Utah 1986).
Subsection (l)(h) is directory in nature, not
mandatory. State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991).
Defendant, who failed to present any argument that he was actually prejudiced by a delay
of 124 days between arrest and trial, was not
denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).

-Waiver.
Defendant, in criminal action, may waive
right to speedy trial hereunder and under Sixth
Amendment to federal Constitution. He cannot
remain inactive and afterwards complain that
he was not given a speedy trial and interpose
that as a defense; and failure to make any
request for trial after filing of information constitutes such waiver. State v. Bohn, 67 Utah
362, 248 P. 119 (1926).
Testimony of spouse.
-Comment on failure of spouse to testify.
In a rape case where defendant's defense was
• alibi that at the time of the commission of the
crime he was at his home with his wife, it was
prejudicial error for the prosecutor to remark to
the jury that defendant's wife had failed to
testify in his behalf, as this remark had the
effect of destroying the privilege granted under
former section. State v. Brown, 14 Utah 2d 324,
383 P.2d 930 (1963).
Prosecuting attorney did not commit prejudicial error under Utah Const., Art. I, § 12, by
commenting at second trial, at which wife tes-

tified in support of defendant's alibi, that although wife attended first trial she asserted
privilege and did not testify. State v. Brown, 16
Utah 2d 57, 395 P.2d 727 (1964).

-Competency.
A wife was an incompetent witness against
her husband on his trial for polygamy, because
polygamy was not a crime against her within
the meaning of statute. Bassett v. United
States, 137 U.S. 496, 34 L. Ed. 762, 11 S. Ct.
165, 34 L. Ed. 726 (1890).
-Right of spouse to testify in own behalf.
Where both spouses are charged with a
crime, one spouse may voluntarily testify in his
own behalf even though his testimony brings
out some evidence against the other spouse.
State v. Trevino, 574 P.2d 1157 (Utah 1978).
-Time of marriage.
It made no difference at what time the relationship of husband and wife commenced, the
principle of exclusion being applied to its full
extent whenever the interests of either of them
were directly concerned. Accordingly, where accused married witness after his indictment and
prior to trial thereon, witness was not competent without his or her consent, even though
marriage was contracted for the purpose of
closing mouth of witness. United States v.
White, 4 Utah 499, 11 P. 570 (1886).
-Waiver.
Testimony of spouse was inadmissible only
when given "without the consent of the other"
spouse. Failure to object thereto was an implied
consent or waiver and defendant could not
complain for the first time on appeal. State v.
Cox, 106 Utah 253, 147 P.2d 858 (1944).
Transcripts.
-Legibility.
The condition of transcripts, in which "(illegible)" appeared solely in connection with statements of the court and counsel, did not deprive
the defendant of due process or of the right of
appeal, because the transcripts were virtually
complete and amply adequate for a review of
the defendant's claims. State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d
902 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Cited in State v. Benson, 712 P.2d 256 (Utah
1985); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah
1986); State v. Miller, 747 P.2d 440 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987); State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).
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Contempt proceedings, right to counsel in, 52
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Communication between unmarried couple
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Dismissal without trial - Custody or discharge of
defendant.

(1) (a) Further prosecution for an offense is not barred if the court dismisses
an information or indictment based on the ground:
(i) there was unreasonable delay;
(ii) the court is without jurisdiction;
(iii) the offense was not properly alleged in the information or
indictment; or
(iv) there was a defect in the impaneling or the proceedings
relating to the grand jury.
(b) The court may make orders regarding custody of the defendant
pending the filing of new charges as the interest of justice may require.
Otherwise, the defendant shall be discharged and bail exonerated.
(2) An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the
defendant to trial or upon the statute of limitations is a bar to any other
prosecution for the offense charged.
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PEACE OFFICER DESIGNATION
History: C. 1953, 77-1-7, enacted by L.
1990,ch. 7, § 2.
Compiler'sNotes. - This section recodifies
formerSubsection 77-35-25(d), which is Rule

77-la-1

25(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
For notes from cases construing that rule, see
the Court Rules volume.

CHAPTER la
PEACE OFFICER DESIGNATION
Section
77-la-1.
77-la-l.5.
77-la-2.
77-la-3.
77-la-4.
77-la-5.

Peace officer.
Law enforcement officer.
Correctional officer.
Reserve and auxiliary officers.
Special function officers.
Federal peace officers - Authority.

Section
77-la-6.
77-la-7.
77-la-8.
77-la-9.

Basic training requirements for
position - Peace officers temporarily in the state.
Renumbered.
Retirement.
References in other provisions.

77-la-1. Peace officer.
(1) (a) "Peace officer" means any employee of a law enforcement agency that
is part of or administered by the state or any of its political subdivisions,
and whose duties consist primarily of the prevention and detection of
crime and the enforcement of criminal statutes or ordinances of this state
or any of its political subdivisions.
(b) "Peace officer" specifically includes the following:
(i) any sheriff or deputy sheriff, police officer, or marshal of any
county, city, or town;
(ii) the commissioner of public safety and any member of the
Department of Public Safety certified as a peace officer;
(iii) all persons specified in Section 23-20-1.5;
(iv) any police officer employed by any college or university;
(v) investigators for the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division;
(vi) special agents or investigators for the attorney general, district
attorneys, and county attorneys;
(vii) employees of the Department of Natural Resources designated
as peace officers by law; and
(viii) school district police officers as designated by the board of
education for the school district;
(ix) the executive director of the Department of Corrections and
any correctional enforcement or investigative officer designated by the
executive director and approved by the commissioner of public safety
and certified by the Peace Officers Standards and Training Division;
and
(x) members of a law enforcement agency established by a private
college or university provided that the college or university has been
certified by the commissioner of public safety according to rules of the
Department of Public Safety.
(2) Peace officers have statewide peace officer authority, but the authority
extends to other counties, cities, or towns only when they are acting under
Title77, Chapter 9, Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit. This limitation does not
applyto any peace officer employed by the state. The authority of peace officers
employedby the Department of Corrections is regulated by Title 64, Chapter
13,Department of Corrections - State Prison.
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(3) (a) A peace officer shall, prior to exercising peace officer authori •
satisfactorily complete the basic course at a certified peace officer trai •
academy or pass a certification examination as provided in Secti
53-6-206, and be certified.
(b) In addition, a peace officer shall satisfactorily complete ann
certified training of at least 40 hours per year as directed by the direc
of the Peace Officer Standards and Training Division, with the advice
consent of the Peace Officer Standards and Training Council.
History: C. 1953, 77-la-1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 174, § 3; 1987, ch. 69, § 9; 1992, ch.
234, § 58; 1993, ch. 38, § 86; 1993, ch. 103,
§ 5; 1993, ch. 234, § 388.
Amendment Notes. - The 1992 amendment, effective April 26, 1992, substituted "Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division" for "Department
of Business
Administration"
in
Subsection (l)(a)(v) and made stylistic changes.
The 1993 amendment by ch. 38, effective May
3, 1993, inserted "district attorneys" in present
Subsection (l)(b)(vi).
The 1993 amendment by ch. 103, effective
May 3, 1993, inserted the (a) designation in
Subsection (1) and redesignated former Subsection (l)(a) as (l)(b), deleted former Subsection
(l)(b), requiring a police force for a private
college or university to be certified, added Subsections (l)(b)(ix) and (x), added the last sentence of Subsection (2), and made stylistic
changes.
The 1993 amendment by ch. 234, effective
July 1, 1993, deleted "police or" before "law

enforcement agency" in Subsection (1);
present Subsection (l)(b)(ii), deleted "swo
before "member" and added "certified as
peace officer" at the end of the subsecti"
substituted "law enforcement agency" for
lice force" in former Subsection (l)(b), dele
by Laws 1993, ch. 103; in Subsection (3Xa
substituted "A peace officer" for "Peace office
and "53-6-206" for "67-15-8"; in Subsecti
(3)(b), substituted "a peace officer" for "
officers," "Peace Officer Standards and Tra' •
Division" for "Division of Peace OfficerS
dards and Training," and "Peace OfficerS
dards and Training Council" for "Council
Peace Officer Standards and Training."
This section is set out as reconciled by
Office of Legislative Research and Gene
Counsel.
Cross-References. - Department of Pub·
Safety, § 53-1-103.
Natural Resources, Title 63, Chapter 34.
Peace officer training, § 53-6-201 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Authority.
- Undercover investigation.
Subsection (2) of this section and § 77-9-3
(territorial scope of authority) do not merely
apply to the officially exercised acts of a uniformed police officer, but are meant to encompass the total spectrum of an officer's acts and

77-la-1.5.

Law enforcement

authority, including an authorized undercov
investigation of a drug offense. When an o
does not comply with these statutory requ'
ments, however, the information need not
dismissed nor the evidence obtained as a resul•
of the illegal investigation be suppressed. Sta
v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987).

officer.

The following officers may exercise peace officer authority only as specificall•
authorized by law:
(1) reserve and auxiliary officers;
(2) special function officers;
(3) federal police officers; and
(4) correctional officers.
History: C. 1953, 77-la-1.5, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 103, § 6.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1993, ch. 103

became effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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17-la-2. Correctional

77-la-3

officer.

r-'(1) (a) "Correctional officer" means an officer or employee of the Depart-

'

mentof Corrections or youth corrections or any political subdivision of the
state who is charged with the primary duty of providing community
protection.
,,
(b) "Correctional officer" includes an individual assigned to carry out
any of the following types of functions:
(i) controlling, transporting, supervising, and taking into custody of
persons arrested or convicted of crimes;
(ii) supervising and preventing the escape of persons in state and
local incarceration facilities; and
(iii) guarding and managing inmates and providing security and
enforcement services at a correctional facility.
. (2) (a) Correctional officers have peace officer authority only while engaged
in the performance of their duties. The authority of correctional officers
employed by the Department of Corrections is regulated by Title 64,
Chapter 13, Department of Corrections - State Prison.
(b) Correctional officers may carry firearms only if authorized by and
under conditions specified by the director of the Department of Corrections
or the chief law enforcement officer of the employing agency.
(3) (a) An individual may not exercise the authority of a correctional officer
until the individual has satisfactorily completed a basic training program
for correctional officers and the director of the Department of Corrections
or the chief administrator of the employing agency has certified the
completion of training to the director of Peace Officer Standards and
Training.
(b) The Department of Corrections of the state or the employing agency,
shall establish and maintain a corrections officer basic course and inservice training programs as approved by the director of Peace Officer
Standards and Training, with the advice and consent of the Council on
PeaceOfficer Standards and Training. The in-service training shall consist
ofno fewer than 40 hours per year, and shall be conducted by the agency's
ownstaff or other agencies.
Wstory:C. 1953, 77-la-2, enacted by L.
1985,ch.174, § 3; 1993, ch. 103, § 7.
Amendment Notes. - The 1993 amendment,
effectiveMay 3, 1993, subdivided Subsection(1),substituted the introductory language
ofSubsection(l)(b) for "Specific assignments
include,"
deleted former language providing for
supervisionof parolees and probationers,
added
Subsection(l)(b)(iii), subdivided Subsection(2),substituted the last sentence of Subsection(2)(a) for former language providing

peace officer status for off duty activities, substituted "An individual may not exercise the
authority of a correctional officer until the individual" for "No correctional officer or parole
and probation agent may exercise the authority
of a peace officer until the officer" in Subsection
(3)(a), inserted "in-service" in Subsection (3)(b),
and made stylistic changes.
Cross-References. - Department of Corrections, Title 64, Chapter 13.
Peace officer training, § 53-6-201 et seq.

77-la-3. Reserve and auxiliary officers.
(1) "Reserve and auxiliary officers" means sworn officers who serve at the
pleasureand under the direction of the chief law enforcement officer or
administratorof the state or any of the political subdivisions of the state.
(2) Reserve or auxiliary officers have peace officer authority only while
engagedin the law enforcement activities authorized by the chief law enforce497
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ment officer or administrator of the agency the officers serve. Reserve
auxiliary officers may carry firearms only if authorized and under conditio
the chief law enforcement officer or administrator specifies.
(3) (a) No reserve or auxiliary officer may exercise the authority of a pea
officer unless the officer has satisfactorily completed the basic tr • •
program for reserve or auxiliary officers as provided in Subsection (3)(
and the chief law enforcement officer or administrator has certified
completion of training to the director of Peace Officer Standards an
Training.
(b) The agency the reserve or auxiliary officer serves shall establish
maintain a basic reserve or auxiliary course and in-service trai •
programs as approved by the director of Peace Officer Standards
Training with the advice and consent of the Council on Peace Offi
Standards and Training. The training shall consist of no fewer than
hours per year, and shall be conducted by the agency's own staff or o
agencies.
History: C. 1953, 77-la-3, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 174, § 3.

77-la-4.

§

Cross-References.
53-6-201 et seq.

- Peace officer tra· •

Special function officers.

(1) (a) "Special function officers" means persons performing
investigations, service of legal process, or security functions.
(b) "Special function officers" include state military police, constabl
port-of-entry agents as defined in Section 27-12-2, school district securi •
officers, Utah State Hospital security officers designated pursuant
Section 62A-12-203, Utah State Training School security officers desig
nated pursuant to Subsection 62A-5-206(9), fire arson investigators fi
any political subdivision of the state, airport security officers of any airpo ,
owned or operated by the state or any of its political subdivisions, railroa
special agents deputized by a county sheriff under Section 17-30-2, and
other persons designated by statute as having peace officer authority.
(c) Ordinance enforcement officers employed by municipalities or coun
ties may be special function officers.
(2) (a) Special function officers have peace officer authority only w •
engaged in the duties of their employment, and not for the purpose
general law enforcement. If the officer is charged with security functi
respecting facilities or property, the powers may be exercised only •
connection with acts occurring on the property where the officer •
employed or when required for the protection of the employer's interes~
property, or employees.
•
(b) Airport security officers have total peace officer authority when
duty and when acting in relation to the responsibilities of the airport
which they are employed, providing that the powers may be exercised onl.
in connection with acts occurring on the property of the airport.
(c) Special function officers may carry firearms only if authorized an
under conditions specified by the officer's employer or chief administrator.,
The carrying of firearms by constables is authorized only while they •
engaged in the duties of their employment.
(3) (a) A special function officer may not exercise the authority of a peace
officer until the officer has satisfactorily completed an approved basi
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training program for special function officers as provided under Subsection (b) and the chieflaw enforcement officer or administrator has certified
this fact to the director of the Peace Officer Standards and Training
Division. City and county constables and their deputies shall certify their
completion of training to the legislative governing body of the county they
serve.
(b) The agency that the special function officer serves shall establish
and maintain a basic special function course and in-service training
programs as approved by the director of the Peace Officer Standards and
Training Division with the advice and consent of the Peace Officer
Standards and Training Council. The training shall consist of no fewer
than 40 hours per year and shall be conducted by the agency's own staff or
other agencies.
History: C. 1953, 77-la-4, enacted by L.
1985,ch. 174, § 3; 1987, ch. 203, § 2; 1990,
ch.44, § 12; 1991, ch. 213, § 4; 1993, ch. 185,
§ 1; 1994, ch. 7, § 8.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, in the second
sentenceof Subsection (1) added the reference
to Utah State Hospital security officers and
added"that" in the first sentence in Subsection
(3Xb).
The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993,

subdivided Subsection (1), substituted "'Special
function officers'" for "These officers" at the
beginning of Subsection (l)(b), added Subsection (l)(c), deleted "respective" before "employment" in Subsection (2)(a), and made stylistic
changes.
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994,
substituted "port-of-entry agents as defined in
Section 27-12-2" for "port-of-entry officers" near
the beginning of Subsection (l)(b).

77-la-5. Federal peace officers - Authority.
(1) (a) "Federal peace officers" include:
(i) special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
(ii) special agents of the United States Secret Service;
(iii) special agents of the United States Customs Service, excluding
customs inspectors;
(iv) special agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms;
(v) special agents of the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency; and
(vi) United States marshals, deputy marshals, and special deputy
United States marshals.
(b) The Council on Peace Officer Standards and Training may designate
other federal peace officers, as necessary, if the officers:
(i) are persons employed full-time by the United States government
as federally recognized law enforcement officers primarily responsible
for the investigation and enforcement of the federal laws;
(ii) have successfully completed formal law enforcement training
offered by an agency of the federal government consisting of not less
than 400 hours; and
(iii) maintain in-service training in accordance with the standards
of the employing federal agency.
(2) Federal peace officers have statewide peace officer authority relating to
felonyoffenses under the laws of this state.
(3) Federal peace officers may have statewide peace officer authority relating t,o misdemeanor offenses only if:
(a) the state law enforcement agency with jurisdiction over the misdemeanor signs a contract with the federal agency to be given misdemeanor
authority; and
499
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(b) each federal peace officer employed by the federal agency completes
a course on the state statutes approved by the Council on Peace Officer•
Standards and Training.
History: C. 1958, 77-la-5, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 174, § 3; 1987, ch. 92, § 154; 1991,
ch. 197, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, in Subsection (1)
added the Subsection (a) designation, substituted the present language of the introductory

77-la-6.

paragraph for "'Federal officers' are:", and substituted the present roman numeral subsection
designations for the former letter designations;
added Subsection (l)(b); substituted "relating"
for "as it relates" in Subsection (2); and added
Subsection (3).

Basic training requirements
for position
Peace officers temporarily in the state.

-

(1) All persons who have satisfactorily completed, before the effective date of
this chapter, an approved basic training program required of their positions
may act in a certified capacity without completion of an additional basic
training program. Any person hired, appointed, or elected to any position
designated in this chapter, except federal officer, shall satisfactorily complete
the required basic training required of that position before the person is
authorized to exercise peace officer powers under this chapter.
(2) Any peace officer employed by a law enforcement agency of another state
and functioning in that capacity within Utah on a temporary basis is
considered certified under Utah law:
(a) while functioning as a peace officer within the state at the request of
a Utah law enforcement agency; or
(b) when conducting business as a representative of a law enforcement'
agency from another state.
History: C. 1958, 77-la-6, enacted by L.
3; 1988,ch.135,§
4.
1985,ch.174,§
Compiler's Notes. - The phrase "effective
date of this chapter" in the first sentence in

77-la-7.

Renumbered.

Renumbered. - Laws 1993, ch. 234, § 289
renumbers this section, specifying the responsibility of the division for training and provid-

77-la-8.

Subsection (1) means April 29, 1985, the effective date of Laws 1985, ch. 174, § 3, which;
enacted §§ 77-la-1 to 77-la-9.

ing for reliance on agency certification of com,,
pleted training, as § 53-6-212, effective July i;.
1993.
'

Retirement.

Eligibility for coverage under the Public Safety Retirement System or Public
Safety Noncontributory Retirement System for persons and political subdivisions included in this chapter is governed by Title 49, Chapters 4 and 4a.
History: C. 1953, 77-la-8, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 174, § 3; 1989, ch. 82, § 4.
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77-la-9. References

77-2-1

in other provisions.

Whenthe term peace officer, or any category of peace officer, is used in any
other provision of law, the term includes anyone authorized to exercise
authorityas provided in this chapter, except federal officers.
History:C. 1953, 77-la-9, enacted by L.
1985,ch. 174,§ 3.

CHAPTER2
PROSECUTION, SCREENING AND
DIVERSION
Section
77-2-1.
77-2-1.1.
77-2-2.
77-2-3.

Authorization to file information.
Signing and filing of information.
Definitions.
Thrmination of investigative action.
Dismissal of prosecution.
77-2-4.
77-2-4.5. Dismissal by compromise - Limitations.
Diversion agreement - Negotia77-2-5.
tion - Contents.

77-2-1. Authorization

Section
77-2-6.
77-2-7.
77-2-8.
77-2-9.

Dismissal after compliance with
diversion agreement.
Diversion not a conviction.
Violation of diversion agreement
- Hearing - Prosecution resumed.
Offenses ineligible for diversion.

to file information.

Unless otherwise provided by law, no information may be filed charging the
commissionof any felony or class A misdemeanor unless authorized by a
prosecutingattorney.
History: C. 1953, 77-2-1, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
jurisdiction. State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646
P.2d 727 (Utah 1982).

ANALYSIS

Authorizationby prosecuting attorney.
Stepsrequired to initiate prosecution.

Authorizationby prosecuting attorney.
Oncethe information is authorized by a prosecutingattorney, its presentment and filing are
not acts which the prosecuting attorney must
personally perform. State ex rel. Cannon v.
Leary,646 P.2d 727 (Utah 1982).
Althoughprosecutor's authorization and signature affixed on the reverse side of the informationviolated R.Civ.P. lO(d) requirement limitingimpressions to one side of the paper only,
violation did not deprive the trial court of

Steps required to initiate prosecution.
The steps required to properly initiate prosecution of a felony by information are: screening of the case by the prosecutor; authorization
of the prosecution, evidenced by the signature
of the prosecutor affixed to the information;
presentment of the information to a magistrate;
subscribing and swearing to the information by
the complaining witness; and filing of the information with the magistrate or clerk of the
court. State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646 P.2d
727 (Utah 1982).
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